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Abstract
The new concept for operation of drones, published by EASA in 2015, enables new ways to influence and possibly reduce the 
necessary safety targets of certain system components without reducing the overall safety of the unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS). Based on the safety assessment, the specific category enables new aircraft system architectures and mission designs. 
In this context, this paper analyzes runtime monitoring as a strategy to contain the UAS in its operational volume. To assure 
predefined properties in flight and thus assure the safety of the operation in progress with a high robustness, a formal meth-
odology for safe operation monitoring is utilized. With this approach, this work targets to link the concept of safe operation 
monitoring with the upcoming regulations regarding the specific category and the specific operation risk assessment (SORA). 
One particular aspect of this safe operation monitoring is geofencing, the capability to contain a UAS in a previously restricted 
area. In the regulatory framework of a specific operation, risk assessment is required and so is the containment of the UAS 
in its operational volume. The functional and safety requirements for geofencing regarding their impact on the underlying 
specific operation risk assessment are discussed. To facilitate this discussion, a taxonomy of geofencing characteristics is 
derived based on a literature survey. Consequently, the geofencing requirements are assessed regarding their robustness and 
applicability for certification purposes. As a result, by monitoring the integrity of the system at runtime using geofencing as 
an example, it is investigated if the requirements and thus costs of development and certification process for the remaining 
components can be reduced.
Keywords UAS · Safety requirements · Specific operation risk assessment (SORA) · Runtime monitoring · Geofencing
1 Introduction
In late 2015, EASA introduced three categories of UAS 
operation that can be regulated and certified based on the 
intrinsic risks involved [1–3]. The three categories are 
referred to as open, specific and certified. The open category 
is reserved for low risk operation under strict restrictions 
of unmanned aircraft below 25 kg used in the visual line of 
sight (VLOS), requiring no or minimal regulation. The certi-
fied category is used for operations that are of an equivalent 
level of risk comparable to manned aviation, using the same 
level of rigour and requiring an aircraft type certification. 
The core of the new concept, however, is the specific cat-
egory that allows a stepwise adaptation of regulation and 
certification requirements between the two other categories 
(Fig. 1). According to it, the necessary certification effort 
scales with the actual risks of the operation of interest. The 
specific category uses a so-called specific operation risk 
assessment (SORA) for analysis and categorizes the required 
level of rigour for UAS development and operation [4]. This 
approach is not targeted solely on the UAS, but towards the 
operation of a specific UAS in its entirety, including: the 
mission, the environment, operation conditions, rigour dur-
ing development as well as operator and pilot qualification.
The DLR (German Aerospace Center) is currently 
applying the SORA to a cargo application with the project 
ALAADy (automated low altitude air delivery) [5] and 
investigates different means to exploit the advantages of 
the new specific category concept. In this project, differ-
ent drone configurations are compared, all of which carry 
approximately one metric ton of payload. The mission is 
cargo delivery on a range of around 600 km flying over 
sparsely populated areas. The drones are intended to fly at 
low altitude to circumvent most of the air traffic. Technologi-
cally and economically, different concepts are analyzed and 
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discussed. This includes aspects of the required levels of 
autonomy, concepts of infrastructure, and the system com-
ponents required to achieve the goal of cargo transporta-
tion. By designing the aircraft configurations and defining 
appropriate use cases, the risks involved are determined. In 
particular, it is important to develop a suitable, high-quality 
set of functional and safety requirements to support the nec-
essary risk assessment that is required to evaluate applicabil-
ity within the specific category. The discussion of this paper 
is based on this mission specification with the bigger picture 
of general drone operation in mind.
DLR is researching the use of a runtime monitor onboard 
an UAS to further support the concept of specific opera-
tion. We refer to this monitor as safe operation monitor. In 
particular, it is planned to monitor the aircraft at runtime 
and supervise specific properties and requirements that are 
related to both safety and the specific mission operation. 
In contrast to manned aviation, where the pilot on-board 
manages hazardous situations, there is no person on-board 
in the drone context. Instead, the suggested monitor takes 
over parts of the supervisional tasks of the pilot who, if pre-
sent at all, is located at a remote pilot station. This paper 
exemplifies geofencing, which is the capability of the UAS 
to safely avoid certain predefined areas, as a containment 
strategy of the specific category approach on one hand; and 
as a use case of runtime monitoring using our proposed 
safe operation monitor on the other hand. The resulting set 
of functional and safety requirements under investigation, 
along with the aforementioned monitoring approach, must 
be suitable for integration into the SORA holistic risk model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: after 
highlighting some of the important related work in Sect. 2, 
the SORA process is briefly explained in Sect. 3. Section 4 
introduces the concept of runtime monitoring as a way of 
implementing the containment requirement of SORA. Sec-
tion 5 assesses the applicability of the safe operation moni-
toring in the context of the SORA process. In this paper, we 
focus on the aspect of geofencing but the concept presented 
can be applied to other means of operation as well. The nec-
essary requirements for this geofence monitoring are derived 
by developing a generic taxonomy for geofencing in Sect. 6. 
These requirements are assessed in Sect. 7 with respect to 
the necessary SORA process and the resulting robustness 
levels are discussed and exemplified. Finally, Sect. 8 sum-
marizes the proposed approach and results.
2  Related work
Developing software for safety critical systems has provided 
topics for research for years. In general, to consider safety 
within the development, some sort of safety assessment is 
performed. The well-known functional hazard assessment 
(FHA) can be used as a structured approach, and the two 
alternatives are: a use case or scenario-based analysis [6] 
or fault trees [7]. The results of this analysis can then be 
considered as a quality measure of the software product or 
as a basis for the requirement definition [6–8].
Applying the same approach for UAS safety risk mitiga-
tion that is used for manned aviation is considered to hinder 
many of the UAS business cases. Traditional certification 
for manned aircraft imposes significant development costs. 
For this reason, aviation authorities as well as the UAS com-
munity are trying to identify the safety risks involved in 
the operation (cf [9].) and search for alternative approaches 
of certification, like the already mentioned SORA [4] or 
specific safety cases [10] in particular, for operation over 
populated areas. The overall trend currently emphasizes 
risk-based approaches, as does this work. In fact, EASA 
plans to implement risk-based approaches in the near future 
[1–3, 11]. The integration of UAS in civil airspaces, and its 
safety aspects and risks thus received particular research 
interest [12–14]. Smaller scale UAS often operate in very 
low level flight, which has also been considered for airspace 
integration [15]. An extension of the very low level airspace 
towards larger scale unmanned aircraft utilizing a risk-based 
approach is presented in [16].
To facilitate low level airspace integration, geofencing 
has recently been under investigation [17]; NASA specifi-
cally targeted the safety requirements for geofencing [18]. 
EUROCAE also investigates UTM geofencing and dynamic 
geofencing in working group 105, SG 33 [33]. In this group 
there are 2 specific documents being developed, Minimum 
Operational Performance Specification for UAS geo-caging 
as well as Minimum Operational Performance Standard for 
UAS geofencing. It is interesting to note that the working 
group is establishing separate definitions for the terms geoc-
aging (authorized volume, not to exit) and geofencing (unau-
thorized volume, not to enter). In the scope of this work, 
there will be no differentiation between these two terms, 
Fig. 1  Specific assurance and integrety level, following [4]
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and geofencing will be used to describe both. One challeng-
ing aspect of geofencing approach is the need of an assured 
source of positioning information as GPS can suffer from 
reliability issues. In [19], an architecture for the geofencing 
system is presented including a hazard assessment. The work 
suggests additional infrastructure to determine position inde-
pendent of GPS. Furthermore, an example of a geofencing 
system capable of handling automatic and remotely piloted 
flight is given in [20]. In [21], special requirements for a 
variable geofence are assessed, considering performance 
capabilities of the UAS and wind conditions.
In this context of geofencing, runtime monitoring espe-
cially utilizing formal methods can play an important role. 
For example, [22] presents a runtime monitor to check a 
non-assured control system by comparing its outputs against 
an assured implementation during operation. In [23], an 
approach is presented to assess the overall system health 
using runtime monitoring. In accordance, in [24] a contin-
gency management architecture is presented that relies on 
such health information.
Certification for safety critical software sets high verifica-
tion requirements that impose huge efforts on development 
and verification, especially using traditional verification 
approaches [25]. The aforementioned approaches utilize 
formal methods to systematically achieve provable system 
properties using mathematical rigour. Nonetheless, there 
is still a relatively little use of these methods in commer-
cial projects. A 2013 study identifies nine barriers to the 
introduction of formal methods [26]. One of the reasons for 
the low spread of formal methods, even in safety–critical 
domains, is the uncertainty about the certification credit 
resulting from the use of these techniques. The software 
development standard for safety critical software DO-178B 
[27] did not include any guidelines for the use of formal 
methods. However, since late 2011, the successor standard 
DO-178C [28] directly supports the use of formal methods 
with a designated supplement DO-333 [29]. As a result, a 
lot of researches are looking at the effectiveness of formal 
methods in regard to certification for safety critical domains, 
for example, using Simulink and SCADE [30] as tools, as 
well as general guidance to use these methods for certifica-
tion credit [31, 32]. It is therefore also of interest to assess 
the impact of the use of formal methods in the context of 
the SORA process.
3  Specific operation risk assessment
As briefly discussed above, the open category addresses 
UAS operations that do not require an authorization by 
the national aviation authorities prior to the operation due 
to minimal risks to people and environment. For example, 
very small UAS and toy drones that pose only small risks 
are categorized as open. In contrast to this, the certified 
category has very high safety requirements. UAS that oper-
ate in this category need to be certified by an official avia-
tion authority, and handling needs to be done by a licensed 
pilot and an approved operator. While the open category 
has already been addressed in some detail by EASA, a 
lot of the details of the specific category are still in the 
definition phase. The necessary efforts for certification of 
a specific category UAS are based on the SORA [4], and 
these efforts scale to the overall risk with an increasing 
level of rigour for aircraft development and operation plan-
ning. This assessment is a risk-based approach considering 
not only the UAS but the whole intended operation. The 
SORA process proposes a holistic risk model that com-
bines ground and air collision risk. As a result, SORA 
divides the specific category in six specific assurance and 
integrity levels (SAIL), Fig. 1.
The SORA process is meant to be used iteratively to 
determine the SAIL and consecutively perform a risk 
assessment. A simplified schematic of the SORA process 
is shown in Fig. 2. The input for SORA is a so-called con-
cept of operations (CONOPS) document, which contains 
information on the operator, the planned operation, technical 
data of the UAS, mitigation strategies in case of a loss of 
control and information of the remote crew. With this infor-
mation, a score for ground and air risk can be found. The 
SORA implements ground and air risk classes as a meas-
urement for potential danger of the UAS and its operation 
to other people and infrastructure. The determined ground 
risk class depends on the characteristic dimension of the 
UAS, the population density of the area of operation and a 
distinction between flights in the visual line of sight (VLOS) 
and beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS). The air risk 
class, on the other hand, depends on the airspace density 
and the operational flight altitude. A distinction is also made 
between flight altitude below 500 ft and flight altitude above 
500 ft. The overall SAIL is determined by analysing both the 
ground risk and the air risk classes.
Fig. 2  Simplified SORA process, modified from [34] (SORA ED 1.0)
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Each SAIL entails different levels of robustness required 
for a set of operational safety objectives (OSO) established 
to ensure safe UAS operations. These objectives are meant 
to reduce the risk of an operation getting out of control. An 
UAS operation is out of control when the operation is con-
ducted outside of the approved concept of operations. An 
operation being out of control does not necessarily mean that 
the UAS itself is technically out of control, e.g., a change in 
weather conditions can lead to an operation being outside of 
the defined concept of operations. Each OSO has four level 
of robustness: optional, low, medium and high. The level of 
robustness of each OSO can be understood as the necessary 
rigour and is expressed with a level of integrity and a level 
of assurance. The assurance is a requirement on how the 
effectivity of the OSO must be verified. Generally speak-
ing, a low level assurance is achieved by self-declaration; 
a medium level assurance by supporting evidence such as 
analyses and simulations, and a high level assurance can 
only be achieved by a third party verification. In contrast, 
the integrity is a requirement on how the OSO has to be 
applied. As the SAIL increases, the same is required for the 
robustness of the OSO.
Additionally, the so-called mitigations are proposed. 
Mitigations are measures to reduce the consequences and 
the likelihood of harm to other people or infrastructure, in 
case the UAS operation is in fact out of control. Depending 
on the robustness of the mitigation (not implemented, low, 
medium or high), it is possible to reduce the ground and air 
risk classes. This reduction can lead to a lower SAIL clas-
sification, which also results in the reduction of required 
robustness level of the OSO.
In SORA, there are pre-described mitigations that can 
be applied to reduce the ground risk and air risk classes. 
Mitigations for ground risk are meant to reduce the number 
of people at risk or the severity of an impact on ground. In 
contrast, the mitigations for air risk shall prevent mid-air 
collision. Some of them are required depending on the air 
risk class, such as detect and avoid systems. Within SORA, 
the required mitigations for air risk are called tactical miti-
gations. Those are more comparable to the OSO. Others 
such as airspace restriction or reduction of time of exposure 
are optional and have an impact on the air risk class. Those 
optional mitigations are called strategic mitigations within 
SORA.
“Strategic mitigations for ground risk” is a very important 
concept to minimize ground risks, by including a risk buffer 
around the area of operation. This concept is also applicable 
to the air risk class as a strategic mitigation. The buffer is 
meant to reduce risks to people and other aircraft by increas-
ing the distance between the UAS operational volume and 
adjacent areas where more victims could potentially exist. 
A schematic of the interaction of the risk buffer with the 
operational volume is shown in Fig. 3.
The robustness of the risk buffer depends on the strat-
egy to determine the buffer size. A buffer following a sim-
ple one-to-one rule, meaning at a flight altitude of 150 m 
Fig. 3  Graphical representation of operational volume and risk buffer interaction, modified from [4]
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the buffer must be at least 150 m in size, is regarded with 
a low robustness. For medium and high robustness lev-
els, the buffer size has to consider weather conditions as 
well as aircraft behaviour in case of normal, abnormal 
and emergency situations. Additionally, the reduction of 
people at risk has to be proven by local population density 
data.
The risk buffer mitigation is strongly linked to an addi-
tional containment requirement. Regardless of the use of 
a risk buffer, it is still required to contain the UAS against 
volumes with higher risk ratings than the claimed opera-
tional volume. SORA has two levels of rigour regarding the 
containment requirement. The general requirement regard-
ing safety is [4]:
“No probable failure of the UAS or any external sys-
tem supporting the operation shall lead to operation 
outside of the operational volume.”
If the operational volume must be contained to avoid 
gatherings of people, high density airspace, or if the ground 
risk buffer has been used in populated environment to reduce 
the initial ground risk, following safety requirements apply 
[4]:
“The probability of leaving the operational volume 
shall be less than 10−4 per flight hour. No single fail-
ure of the UAS or any external system supporting the 
operation shall lead to operation outside of the ground 
risk buffer. Software (SW) and airborne electronic 
hardware (AEH) whose development error(s) could 
directly lead to operations outside of the ground risk 
buffer shall be developed to an industry standard or 
methodology recognized as adequate by the competent 
authority.”
Since the costs for certification by assuring OSO with 
high robustness can increase to levels almost equivalent 
to those of the certified category, it is expected to be cost 
effective to add mitigations and increase their robustness 
to achieve an overall reduction of UAS development and 
operation costs. New results within the aforementioned DLR 
ALAADy project show that it is beneficial to add mitigations 
to reduce the risk class, at least for moderate and higher risk 
operations [35].
However, the interaction of the implementation and 
operation costs of mitigations and OSO, especially if these 
involve limitations in operation, has not yet been completely 
answered. Handling this interplay and deriving sweet spots 
of safeness and operation costs will be a great challenge for 
the near future. Especially, transferring this holistic view 
of the SORA on safety to a holistic view on system design 
including the operators, pilots and operation itself might 
enable new realizations of UAS that, to this day, have not 
yet been possible.
To target the benefit of applying mitigations, our approach 
uses runtime monitoring to supervise properties of the 
aircraft as well as the operation. One specific use case of 
restricting operational behaviour is geofencing as an option 
to assure the mitigation “risk buffer”. Geofencing and its 
functional as well as quality requirements will be discussed 
as an exemplary use case for our monitoring approach.
4  Runtime monitoring concept
In general, monitoring is the concept of supervising specific 
values and properties of a system. Runtime monitoring does 
this in parallel to the running system, in this case for an 
aircraft in flight. For specific purposes, this is already done 
in several layers throughout the aircraft system as well as 
aircraft operations. For example, some low level tasks exist 
with automated forms of monitoring, but many monitoring 
tasks are manual. In particular, the final as well as high-level 
task of supervision of the flight itself is still performed by a 
pilot. Flight supervision is performed manually for manned 
aviation, but also for UAS, utilizing a multitude of displays 
in a ground control station.
We propose the use of a formal method for the moni-
toring on the aircraft level as well as on the mission level. 
This approach enables to achieve a high degree of assurance 
and the possibility to achieve certification, even for complex 
monitoring properties. By relying on a trustworthy module 
for the monitoring of specific properties that is also capable 
of describing complex time-dependent properties, higher 
level tasks can additionally be automated. In this paper, we 
discuss the functional requirements of geofencing and how 
geofencing can be implemented using a runtime monitoring 
methodology. The idea of using a formal methodology is 
that, based on the formal specification, a provable correct 
implementation of the monitoring can be generated. There 
are also on-going researches on generating FPGA hardware 
implementations of such a monitoring solution.
The formal methodology for the description of monitored 
properties is LTL, linear temporal logic. This mathematical 
formalism allows describing properties that not only use the 
current state, but also the previous values of states and vari-
ables. It is possible through LTL to reference future states of 
a property; however, this requires a so-called late evaluation 
which delays the evaluation until all relevant inputs values 
are available. Technical details of this approach are in active 
research, but first results can be found in [23, 36].
In the case of geofencing, the monitoring module super-
vises the position and acts as an independent geofencing 
mechanism. For this, the monitoring must be able to assess 
various data of the UAS in real time (Fig. 4). Foremost, the 
current geo-localization of the UAS needs to be assessed in 
the context of a given geofence as the safety requirement to 
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check if the aircraft is violating its borders. It is the respon-
sibility of the monitoring to determine if the aircraft poses a 
risk in the given situation (see Sect. 3). For complete inde-
pendence, it is also possible that the safe operation monitor-
ing utilizes its own sensors for geo-localization.
The monitoring alone, however, cannot render the air-
craft operation safe. It rather enables a subsequent action 
that will resolve the situation. The action that is triggered 
by the safe operation monitoring has to be able to transition 
the system to a safe state without posing additional risks. 
For the operation over sparsely populated areas, in the con-
text of the geofence, a last resort of such an action would 
be the safe termination of the aircraft before violating the 
given geofence border. Although this might seem a harsh 
solution from the economic perspective, this approach can 
autonomously guarantee a permanent safe state, even if the 
aircraft attempts to violate the geofence. It is however pos-
sible, in addition to the safe termination, to define additional 
contingency procedures [24] that try to prevent a termination 
(Fig. 4). This will further benefit the economical perspective, 
but not the safety perspective; however, in scope of this work 
we are concentrating on the safety perspective. Additionally, 
it is possible that the monitoring only triggers a warning to 
the ground control station to enable the pilot to resolve the 
situation manually, depending on the level of autonomy that 
is performed by the UAS.
To summarize, the geofencing functionality that assures 
the safety of the specific operation will be implemented by 
the formal runtime monitoring approach, as discussed in this 
section. The formality of the approach assures correctness 
of the behaviour and allows generating modules or FPGA 
implementations with independence of the flight system 
of the aircraft. This enables high levels of robustness and 
assurance. A cost reduction is expected for this approach, 
compared to manual implementations of geofencing func-
tionality, because the monitoring modules can be generated 
and the certification efforts will be reduced, due to the for-
mality of the approach. As a result, the approach transfers 
the efforts of certification from the manually implemented 
safe operation monitor to the formal specification language 
approach. However, it is expected that the formality of the 
approach is beneficial for a certification approach.
5  Assessment of monitoring as part of SORA
The question if runtime monitoring can be beneficial in 
the context of SORA cannot be generally answered. The 
SORA tries to cover a broad range of different UAS types 
and operational scenarios. Therefore, the benefit of a moni-
toring system strongly depends on the use case. We plan to 
contribute to an in-depth discussion on system architectures, 
including monitoring systems, on the basis of SORA and the 
qualitative estimation on implementation efforts in the near 
future. However, we will give an abstract of this discussion 
regarding monitoring as part of SORA in this section.
SORA basically has two layers to enforce safety to 
third parties on ground or in air; one layer being the 
Fig. 4  UAS safe operation monitor concept
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requirements on containment and the other layer being 
the OSOs on UAS design and operator behaviour. From 
SAIL I to SAIL III, the containment requirements are the 
main driver for safety, whereas in SAIL V and VI, the level 
of rigour of the OSOs is superior than the containment 
requirements. SAIL IV can be seen as a transition phase 
where safety constraints are equally distributed between 
containment requirements and OSOs. Throughout this sec-
tion it will be shown that a runtime monitoring concept is 
most beneficial in SAILs I to IV.
The containment requirements the UAS has to fulfil are 
mentioned in Step#9 of the SORA process. Depending 
on the operation there are two level of rigour for the con-
tainment. Within this section the more strict containment 
requirements are discusses, assuming the reasoning will also 
apply for the less strict requirements. According to SORA, 
more strict containment requirements apply when adjacent 
areas to the area of operation are:
• High frequented airspaces such as airport environment 
or European class C airspace; or
• Areas where gathering of people are expected; or
• M1 mitigation (ground risk buffer) has been applied to 
lower the GRC 
Especially mitigation M1 and its link to geofence will 
often force to apply the following containment requirements:
• The probability of leaving the operational volume shall 
be less than 10E-4 per flight hour
• No single failure of the UAS or any external system sup-
porting the operation shall lead to operation outside toe 
ground risk buffer
• Software (SW) and airborne electronic hardware (AEH) 
whose development error(s) could directly lead to opera-
tions outside of the ground risk buffer shall be developed 
to an industry standard or methodology recognized as 
adequate by the competent authority
A monitoring system as discussed throughout this paper 
can help to fulfil these requirements. However, it needs to be 
mentioned that the monitoring system needs to be linked to 
a system that can manipulate the UAS in a way that, at least, 
ends the flight within the ground risk buffer, or can apply 
contingency measures. For the context of this section, it is 
implied that a monitory system has excess to one of those 
abilities. Such a monitoring system complies with the “no 
single failure” requirement by its existence as backup sys-
tem. This kind of redundancy also implies that there are no 
development errors which directly lead to operations outside 
the ground risk buffer. Of course, the redundancy because of 
the monitoring system also contributes to leaving the opera-
tional volume requirement.
Regarding the assurance of such a monitoring system, 
there is no explicit requirement given. Though, assurance 
might be derived from the M1 mitigation when applied and 
done with the same system or the operator can take OSO 
#10/#12 into account. The OSO level of integrity sounds 
fairly similar to the containment requirements and tries 
to accomplish the same goal. SAIL I and II would need a 
low robustness assurance, whereas SAIL III and IV need a 
medium level of assurance.
Regarding the high SAILs V and VI, a monitoring system 
seems not as relevant regarding safety requirements. The 
containment requirement is still relevant, however OSO#5 
now states: 
• Major failure conditions are not more frequent than 
remote
• Hazardous failure conditions are not more frequent than 
extremely remote
• Catastrophic failure conditions are not more frequent 
than extremely improbable
• Software (SW) and airborne electronic hardware (AEH) 
whose development error(s) may cause or contribute to 
hazardous or catastrophic failure conditions are devel-
oped to an industry standard or methodology recognized 
as adequate by the competent authority and/or in accord-
ance with thr means of compliance acceptable to that 
authority
Those requirements have a huge impact on the UAS 
design and architecture and now failure conditions have to 
be considered that require a very robust and safe overall 
UAS design. Depending on the use case a monitoring system 
may still positively contribute to such a system. However it 
is expected that the focus and effort will be mostly on highly 
reliable and robust flight control systems.
6  Monitoring safety and functional 
requirements
Depending on the robustness required for mitigations and 
OSO, the SAIL results in a large number of safety and func-
tional requirements. The management of these requirements 
is a crucial part of each development process. The general 
approach to develop functional requirements is to derive 
them from aircraft requirements. However, in addition to 
the standard processes of requirements management, this 
work focuses on the aspect relevant to the specific opera-
tion concept. The functional requirements in the context of 
this work mainly describe the behavioural properties and 
capabilities of the UAS. The main purpose of these require-
ments is to derive the properties that are used for the safe 
operation monitoring of the aircraft. Given a complete set of 
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safety requirements, each safety incident would be the result 
of a failure of the UAS to fulfil a specific requirement. As a 
result, supervising these critical properties during flight in 
real time would give the possibility to enact upon a failure 
at the earliest possible moment. As an example functional 
requirement, geofencing is used. For a more detailed analy-
sis of this functionality, the characteristics of geofencing will 
be discussed in the following section.
6.1  Characteristics of geofencing
Geofencing simply means that the area where an unmanned 
aircraft is allowed to fly in is limited, and that limitation is 
enforced by a technical implementation of the UAS. For 
example, for the use case of a field that is inspected or fer-
tilized by a drone, it would be possible to define a geofence 
for exactly that field. Geofencing would allow the UAS to 
move freely inside the geofence, but would assure that the 
UAS would not break out of the intended area where the 
mission takes place. This seemingly easy problem solution 
is already a research topic for itself [18, 19]. The problem is 
that on one hand the goal is to maximize the flyable area and 
thus to be able to fly as close to the border of the geofence as 
possible, on the other hand the goal is to assure that the UAS 
does not leave the geofence, even in case of a malfunction.
To systematically define functional requirements for 
geofencing, this paper defines a taxonomy of geofencing 
characteristics and uses this to analyse the necessary require-
ments. The identified characteristics are: level of assurance, 
level of ATM integration, level of independence, buffer type, 
mitigation type, and decision strategy (Fig. 5).
Buffer type, which is a reference to SORA mitigation 
M1, is further sub categorized in buffer accuracy and buffer 
complexity. Buffer complexity describes the safety buffer 
of a geofence. The simplest solution would be to have no 
additional safety buffer to the SORA required minimum one-
to-one rule regarding flight altitude and buffer size. This 
approach would simply check if the UAS is inside or outside 
the defined area, and as soon as a breach of the geofence is 
detected, a mitigation action would be executed. In that case, 
however, the UAS would already be outside of the intended 
area restriction in the event of mitigation, therefore to have 
no safety buffer may only be applicable for the lowest SAIL 
category, if any. A generic safety buffer would improve on 
this by defining a second border. By triggering the mitiga-
tion action as soon as this safety border is breached, the 
geofence would still be in effect. The safety buffer could be 
defined in terms of distance or time to contact at a maximum 
flight speed. An operation specific safety buffer would also 
define a second border, but use the holistic approach from 
the SORA to define the specific buffer that is necessary for 
the operation. The necessary aspects to consider for a holis-
tic point of view would include: system dynamics, weather 
conditions, pilot skills, mitigation actions, and mission char-
acteristics, such as flight attitude, manoeuvre complexity 
and speed.
Buffer accuracy describes the variability of the geofence. 
It could be statically defined, e.g., for each area or for each 
operation, but could also be dynamically accessed to the 
situation in flight. A statically defined safety border could 
mean that a change of weather conditions would result in 
the operation to be aborted, because strong winds would 
increase the risk of breaching the defined geofence. A 
dynamically assessed safety border could incorporate a 
change of weather conditions and allow for the operation 
to continue (in a degraded way), with an increased safety 
border and leading to a smaller allowable area of flight. 
Similar scenarios are possible with each of the necessary 
aspects of the operation specific safety buffer. Finally, such a 
dynamic border could include elements of prediction, where 
expected behaviour of the aircraft is determined based on a 
system model and environment conditions are considered 
using forecasts.
Level of independence is an important aspect of safety. 
Geofencing could be an integrated part of the UAS itself. For 
example, the flight control computer could include this fea-
ture. On the other hand, a single failure in the flight control 
system would result in a failure of the geofencing functional-
ity as well as of the flight control at the same time. This can 
be solved using a separate hardware system for the geofenc-
ing system. A complete independence of the geofencing 
could be achieved by utilization of dedicated sensors. A 
hint that independence is beneficial within the SORA can be 
found in step #9 of adjacent area and airspace considerations 
where the UAS is required to meet failure conditions and 
single failure requirements regarding the operational volume 
and the safety buffer. Generally similar requirements can 
also be found in OSOs #10 and #12 addressing the risk of 
a fatality while operating over populated environments by 
technical containment requirements.
The mitigation type is sub categorized in mitigation 
action and level of autonomy and addresses SORA-required 
contingency and emergency strategies. A mitigation action is 
triggered if the UAS tends to enter the safety buffer. The ulti-
mate mitigation action to contain a UAS inside a geofence, 
even for severe malfunctions, is the safe termination1 of 
the UAS. In fact, for safety reasons, this mitigation should 
always get implemented. However, it should also be possible 
to define an additional fixed contingency procedure, e.g., a 
turn manoeuvre, which could be triggered as a failsafe to 
prevent the termination. It would even be possible to define 
1 Safe termination considers the environment in which the drone is 
terminated and refers to a fast way of ending the flight without caus-
ing harm.
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multiple variable contingency procedures, specific to the 
situation at hand. But even in this case, it should be noted 
that a termination would still need to get triggered if these 
contingencies fail.
The level of autonomy can be manual in case only a 
warning is issued to a pilot and the pilot has to initiate the 
mitigation action. A semi-autonomous level is achieved if 
a warning is issued to a pilot, but mitigation is triggered 
automatically if there is no pilot interaction. Finally, the sys-
tem is fully autonomous if it is designed to act completely 
without human interaction and the mitigation action cannot 
be overruled by a pilot.
UAS designed to standards is directly coupled to SORA 
OSO #4 and refers to applied design standards to the UAS 
and all its sub-systems. This OSO as well as our taxonomy 
distinguishes between three levels of integrity. However, 
SORA is not that clear about which standards should be 
applied; in all three cases, SORA only mentions standards 
that the competent authority considers adequate for the 
desired level of integrity. We suggest to consider the usage 
of at least parts of well-known aircraft design and devel-
opment standards such SAE ARP 4754A and DO-178C 
design assurance level (DAL) C at medium level of integ-
rity. For high level of integrity, we recommend the full use 
of SAE ARP 4754A and DO-178C standards in combination 
with the JARUS AMC RPAS.1309 document. The AMC 
RPAS.1309 document is an acceptable means of compliance 
for unmanned aircraft that defines required failure rates and 
design assurance level of unmanned aircraft.
Level of ATM integration details if there is a link between 
the geofencing system and air traffic management. This 
general characteristic is meant to address possible strategic 
and tactical mitigations of the air risk class section within 
SORA with our geofence-monitoring approach. There can 
be no link between geofence and ATM, but it is also possi-
ble to trigger an ATM notification in case of a breach of the 
geofence. For full transparency, to enrich the simple notifica-
tion, additional information regarding UAS position, speed, 
and type of malfunction could be transmitted. Furthermore, 
a communication link between pilot and ATM could be initi-
ated to provide this additional information.
The next characteristic that will be discussed is the 
decision strategy of a geofence. In the traditional sense a 
geofence is a binary decision. The UAS is either safely con-
tained inside the geofence, or there is a breach of it, or at 
least a risk of breaching the geofence, that is requiring a 
mitigation action. However, future missions might require 
more sophisticated approaches towards containment to 
enable missions that span over large areas or make use 
of extended flight paths. As a result, the decision strategy 
could incorporate conditional decisions for crossing adjacent 
geofences with possibly different requirements and charac-
teristics. For example, one geofence could require constant 
pilot supervision, while an adjacent geofence could be 
supervised automatically. A crossover between two geofence 
zones would only be possible in case of a stable communica-
tion link and authorization from a pilot. This approach could 
be extended to a risk-based decision strategy, incorporating 
detailed environmental information.
The level of assurance describes the verification and 
validation aspects of the geofencing implementation and 
depends on the SORA assurance requirements of the 
mentioned SORA references of the other characteristics. 
This aspect is considered a quality requirement and there-
fore coloured different. The three levels of assurance are 
derived from SORA assurance level definition. A low level 
of assurance is a self-declaration of the operator that the 
required integrity is achieved, whereas the operator has to 
have supporting evidence such as simulations or analyses 
for a medium level of assurance. In case of a high level of 
assurance, the supporting evidence has to be checked by an 
independent and competent authority-accepted third party. 
Additionally, it should be noted that standards, such as DO-
178C, define different design assurance levels with increas-
ing requirements for higher assurance levels, according to 
the results of a safety assessment. The utilization of formal 
methods can further improve assurance, since specific prop-
erties can be verified with mathematical rigour.
6.2  Derived requirements of geofencing
The characteristics of geofencing that have been discussed in 
the previous section result in a set of geofencing functional 
and quality requirements. In the context of the DLR project 
ALAADy, concerning the very low level cargo delivery over 
sparsely populated areas, the requirements shown in Table 1 
can be derived.
After developing such a set of functional and safety 
requirements, these requirements need to be further analysed 
and transformed to properties suitable for runtime moni-
toring. The difficulty of implementing these requirements 
lies in the real-time supervision of specific properties of the 
UAS, in particular, flight speed, altitude, weather conditions 
and incorporating this data into calculations to determine 
dynamic safety buffers for the geofence. The proposed con-
cept of runtime monitoring is suitable for exactly that pur-
pose. However, the variable degree of complexity that will 
be used to implement geofencing functionality is a trade-off 
between effort and benefit resulting from the SORA process, 
as was discussed in Sect. 3.
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Fig. 5  Taxonomy of geofencing characteristics
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7  Monitoring robustness requirements
This section addresses the analysis of robustness of the pro-
posed safe operation monitoring in respect to geofencing 
according to SORA. The current version of SORA offers a 
classification of robustness in two dimensions, integrity and 
assurance, with each three levels of graduation.
Based on the geofence characteristic shown in Sect. 6, it 
is now discussed which level of robustness is reasonable to 
achieve containment using geofence monitoring.
For our specific use case, the ALAADy project, the goal 
is to achieve the high robustness requirement level with our 
formal safe operation monitoring to be able to fly adjacent 
to populated environments.
To optimally use the concept of the specific category, the 
geofence safety buffer complexity should also be specific to 
the operation. It would result in a serious risk to allow the 
UAS to leave the geofence without any safety buffer before 
taking mitigation action. A simple generic safety buffer 
might define a time interval to react and trigger mitiga-
tion or as simple one-to-one rule. But without considering 
specific aspects, there might still remain the risk of the UAS 
violating the geofence during the mitigation action itself. 
As a result, this approach might result in extremely large 
safety buffers or may ultimately not be safe. However, the 
specific operation would allow tailoring the geofence to 
the exact operation using information defined in the con-
cept of operations. This information could include system 
dynamics, mitigation actions, constraints for weather con-
ditions and mission characteristics, such as flight attitude, 
manoeuvre complexity and speed. This approach allows for 
the exact tailoring of the geofence for the specific risk and 
thereby reducing safety buffers. Similarly, a dynamic safety 
buffer may not be needed to achieve a high robustness, but 
can be used to further reduce the safety buffer according 
to real-time flight attitude, speed as well as weather con-
ditions, without increasing the risk. As a result, an oper-
ation-specific, and possibly dynamic safety buffer might 
enable operations that are not possible with a generic safety 
buffer, either due to remaining risk or impractically huge 
safety buffers. The implementation of the geofencing and 
monitoring hardware should be as independent as possible; 
Table 1  Example of geofencing requirements for specific category operation
ID Characteristic Requirement
1 Level of assurance The geofencing system shall be developed using appropriate industry standards and utilizing a formal 
methodology (quality requirement)
2 Buffer type The geofencing system shall supervise the UAS geo-localization and analyse the UAS position in 
regard to defined geofence borders to determine a geofence violation. In particular, this requires 
supervision and analysis of:
 Geofence coordinates
 UAS geo-localization
3 Buffer type, buffer complexity The geofencing system shall incorporate an operation-specific safety buffer to maintain the geofence as 
a strict border even in case of a failure. In addition to already mentioned requirements, this includes 
supervision and analysis of worst-case assumptions:





The geofencing system shall calculate a dynamic safety buffer to maximize the flyable areas inside the 
geofence. In addition to already mentioned requirements, this includes supervision and analysis of 
real-time data:
 System dynamics, in particular, flight speed and altitude
 Weather conditions
5 Level of independence The geofencing system shall be implemented by an independent hardware system to prevent single 
failures to cause a breach of the geofence
6 Mitigation type The geofencing system shall trigger a mitigation action in case of a violation of the borders of the 
geofence
7 Mitigation type, Mitigation action The mitigation shall ultimately result in a safe termination of the UAS to ensure containment of the 
geofence
8 Mitigation type, Mitigation action The geofencing system may have additional contingency procedures for mitigation that try to prevent 
an impending safe termination
9 Mitigation type, Level of autonomy The geofencing system shall have a semi-autonomous mode of operation, assuring containment of the 
geofence even without further pilot interaction
10 Level of ATM integration The geofencing system shall trigger a notification to ATM in case of a violation of the geofence
11 Decision strategy The geofencing system shall support conditional decisions to enable the crossing of borders between 
two adjacent geofencing areas of different types and properties
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however, independent sensors may pose a challenge. To 
achieve safety and high automation, the level of autonomy 
should be high. However, economic aspects also play an 
important role in this. A conditional decision strategy is cur-
rently in research, as this approach could be necessary for 
some specific operations, such as air delivery. The mitigation 
action will be designed as a safe termination; a specially 
designed emergency parachute will be used to reduce the 
possible impact force significantly. Additional contingency 
procedures are planned, but would not be necessary from a 
safety perspective. Further research will need to elaborate 
whether the efforts to achieve the maximum level of robust-
ness for each geofence characteristic are necessary, possible 
or commercially attractive. The overall goal is to lower the 
overall development costs by realizing a monitoring system 
that fulfils the containment requirements by itself.
8  Summary
This paper details the functional and quality requirements for 
UAS safe operation monitoring, specifically for the concept 
of specific operations that was introduced by EASA in late 
2015. The proposed approach of safe operation monitoring 
is exemplified for the use case of geofencing; however, other 
use cases could be implemented analogously to the shown 
approach. Furthermore, a taxonomy of geofencing charac-
teristics has been introduced and resulting requirements have 
been analysed in interdependence with the specific operation 
risk assessment and the concept of a safe operation monitor. 
This taxonomy was validated against the ALAADy use case. 
It can help to assess other geofencing implementations and 
might be reused and extended by other researchers.
Furthermore, the safe operation monitoring is suitable for 
implementation as a containment measure in regard to the 
SORA process because it triggers failsafe mechanisms and 
ensures a safe state. In the case of geofencing, this is done 
by a safe termination. Additionally, safe operation monitor-
ing is also suitable to act as an operational safety objective 
(OSO) by triggering contingency procedures, e.g. by initiat-
ing a turn manoeuvre before violating the geofence. Finally, 
the robustness of geofencing implementations is discussed 
and assessed using the introduced taxonomy of geofencing 
characteristics in regard to the SORA process.
By always ensuring a safe termination and additionally 
utilizing the contingency procedures to prevent this termina-
tion, the safety hazard of an operation being out of control 
can be effectively managed by the proposed safe operation 
monitoring approach. As a result, the containment require-
ment level of rigour that is determined by the SORA process 
can be satisfied to lower the overall development and cer-
tification efforts and costs. However, this imposes that the 
safe operation monitoring itself is developed according to 
the higher level of rigour regarding the containment require-
ments. It is therefore recommended to use formal methods 
for the implementation or verification of the safe operation 
monitoring, to assure specific properties with mathematical 
rigour.
By doing this, this approach transfers efforts and costs 
from the overall aircraft specifically to the assurance of the 
monitoring methodology. The idea is that the formal lan-
guage for specifying monitoring properties has to be devel-
oped once, and then properties and specifically geofences 
can be easily formulated and adapted. As long as the overall 
aircraft architecture respects the monitoring concept, the 
effort of implementing new monitors or a new geofence is 
limited to formulating it in the formal language. It is further 
important to notice that the monitoring approach is suit-
able to different kinds of properties. It is part of an ongoing 
research to determine what aircraft properties are neces-
sary to supervise aircraft safety and enable a safe operation. 
One of these properties is the geofencing. As such, the safe 
operation monitoring can be reused for additional safety 
properties.
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